Faith and Presuppositional Apologetics

An argument I heard recently in defense of theism was the declaration that all beliefs, including beliefs based strictly on externally verifiable evidence (empiricism), require faith to believe.  As is so often the case in philosophical discussions, semantics are the first stumbling block towards establishing common ground, and this is no exception.  The theist also makes the critically invalid epistemological assumption that the opposing party claims 100% certainty in their belief.  (see previous post on agnostic vs. gnostic knowledge)


DEFINING FAITH

First, on the subject of the definition of the word "faith".  I have attempted to define faith in a way that is concise and consistent with English dictionary definitions.  My goal is not to redefine the word to suit my needs, but rather to differentiate the nuanced contexts in which the word can be used and the implications thereof.  We must always understand that one word can have many similar meanings, and it would be a fallacy to claim use of one meaning of a word while using it in the context of another.  However Christianity makes the even larger fallacy of redefining the word so that its definition is so vague that the contexts in which it can be appropriately used begin to blur together.

The biblical definition of "faith" is as follows: "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen" (Hebrews 11:1, KJV).  Interesting.  This doesn't match any of the definitions I've provided in my previous post so what exactly does this mean?  Let's break it down, but beware, like many passages in the bible, it is intentionally vague and open to myriad interpretations.

"The substance of things hoped for"  On closer consideration, I can't see how this section of the biblical definition of the word is even necessary, at least not from an epistemological sense.  The closest I can conclude is that it is roughly equivalent to "those things that we want to believe".  This sounds a lot like putting the cart before the horse.  If you already know what you want to believe BEFORE you have the reason to believe it, then you are definitely not following the rules of evidence based belief.  In evidence based belief, we can certainly make predictions about the perceptions we expect, but the belief is still predicated by the actual existence of that evidence.  In other words, if I'm "hoping for" evidence to support the belief that I can fly by flapping my arms, I must admit it impossible when I fall flat on my face.  Thus, since the Christian's argument is that all belief systems require their definition of the word faith, they are already on the wrong track.

"the evidence of things not seen"  This is the part that is epistemologically relevant, and similar to the definitions I've proposed in my previous post.  The word evidence here is used liberally, and quite arguably incorrectly, so let us replace it with a more neutral synonym we can all agree on.  "information that forms the reason for believing".  Why can't we use the word "evidence"?  Because "evidence" to an empiricist is necessarily external to the believer.  It must be able to be perceived by others in an approximately equal way.  To the empiricist, a rock is evidence since it can be held by anyone and their perceptions of it will be more or less uniform (it's grey, hard, cracks with a hammer, contains recognizable patterns, etc).  A feeling, however, is not evidence.  A memory is not evidence.  These things are considered anecdotal.  While they are not necessarily incorrect, because they can not be experienced external to the individual that maintains them they do not count as evidence.  After all, if the "things" had been "seen" then this definition wouldn't apply anyways.  Since our goal here is to gain common ground in semantics, let us adopt my proposed clarification of the wording above, "The information that forms the reason for believing things not seen"

Unfortunately, my pursuit for clarification requires a second, and I believe equally agreeable, alteration to the definition above.  Since vision is not the only sense that is available to us, let us rephrase the definition as such: Faith is "the information that forms the reason for believing in things not directly perceived"  My goal here is not to confuse or to alter the meaning of this definition, merely to clarify it so that it can be analyzed on equal footing by both the theist and the strict empiricist.  If the definition sounds overly vague, - that's because it is and always was.

This definition could be used in almost any situation where an individual's belief requires perceptions that are not readily available to them...a situation we regularly find ourselves in.  But not all information is created equal.  How would you rate the likelihood of the following sources of information to be accurate?  "A doctor telling you you have cancer; uncle Jim insisting that the president is a communist; an encyclopedia describing the events of WWII; an astrophysicist detailing the prevailing theories describing the origins of the universe; a best friend claiming to have found a miracle pill for weight loss; an ancient text that claims to be the infallible source of truth.  The point of similarity is that each of these constitutes an indirect source of information.  While not as valuable as direct perception, this is better than no information at all, although surely most people would agree that the best friend and uncle Jim are probably full of shit.  As an atheist, I extend this assessment to the ancient text as well, and to anyone or anything claiming infallibility.

This is where one of my definitions of faith establishes a crucial distinction that the biblical definition does not.  "Faith" as a synonym for "trust" can be defined as belief based upon indirect information from a source the individual considers trustworthy.  Does the Bible count here?  Interestingly, in order to be considered trustworthy, the source of information being trusted must already be known to exist.  One can not "trust" that God exists merely upon the second hand information being presented to us by the very god we aim to prove, as this is clearly circular reasoning. The same could equally be said about any deity figure.  You must already believe God exists in order to trust in him, therefore you can not establish god's existence by saying you trust in the writings of bible.  This definition does not match the usage of the word "faith" when a Christian says "I have faith that God exists because I believe his holy word is true"

While belief based on second hand information does fit into the biblical definition of the word faith, it is different from another context in which an individual may claim "information that forms the reason for believing in things not directly perceived"  If direct perception is not possible ("things unseen") and indirect perception is also not possible (2nd hand information), what's left?  Zero perceptions.  To the fervent Christian, true faith does not require any confirmation of the belief's validity, in fact maintaining belief in exactly this situation is revered with promises of reward.  Herein lies my second major definition of the word "faith".  Paraphrased to match the context of the definitions at play here, it is: "the information that forms the reason for believing in things neither directly nor indirectly perceived".  It is tantamount to information that is simply asserted.

While this is not a very flattering distinction, it is nonetheless necessary.  The biblical definition of faith is too vague.  Even if I had not attempted to clarify this definition, it's lack of specificity should be clear.  Sadly, the authors of the book of Hebrews knew what they were doing when redefining "faith" to blur the lines between reasonable information gathering and the foundations of their beliefs.  I can only hope that I have been successful in driving a semantic wedge between these two concepts by differentiating between them clearly.  The purpose behind this distinction should be equally obvious.  Only in faith based belief systems are such assertions of validity made without any call to direct or indirect perceptions.


CERTAINTY (revisited)

Why would the theist even require such assertions in the first place?  Why in the world does such a way of thinking even exist that we would need to define faith it at all?  The answer is "Certainty".  Humans have always had a need for certainty.  In the depths of our historical ignorance we've often resorted to inventing knowledge to fill in the gaps where certainty has been absent.  Of those inventions, the stories that we no longer have a need for we call mythology - those that we do we call religion.

The theist claims and indeed requires the certainty that gnostic knowledge provides, something which is unachievable through imperfect perceptions which are the results of our flawed human senses.  The theist sees a way around this by purporting access to information that is not dependent on these perceptions. But because the theist assumes that his opponent requires this same level of certainty, he makes the error in concluding that unevidenced truth assertions, or faith, is required for belief in anything at all.  The argument completely falls apart if the empiricist is willing to admit that he can not know anything with perfect certainty, thus the requirement for faith is nullified - and honestly so.

So is that the end of it?  Is faith (as distinguished from empirical trust) unique to religious beliefs, and thus open to criticism?  Some Christian Apologists have one final philosophical trick up their sleeves.  The concept of presupposition.


PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS

Much in the same way that a relativist works from a completely different foundation of determining truth than an objectivist, and thus the two are proclaimed to be irreconcilable, the Presuppositional Apologist attests that theism can not even be debated with dissenters because it is based upon unchallengeable assumptions necessary for that worldview.  These are known as presuppositions, and every epistemological viewpoint asserts some.  These apologists have taken the "everything requires faith" argument and dressed it up with new, seemingly valid, philosophical terminology.  Instead of "faith" it is presuppositions that all beliefs require.  Ironically, all this merely accomplishes is putting all beliefs on equal footing, a position that the theist surely does not honestly maintain, and I thusly question the apologist's motivations and integrity

But just how different are the presuppositions of the theist and the atheist?  Not as different as you might initially think.  While we don't agree on the weight that should be given to empirical evidence vs. asserted truths, mainstream Chrisitans and Atheists are almost always both Objectivists, the only exceptions being more likely in the latter.  What this means is that although they disagree on the qualities of reality, they do nonetheless agree that one exists that is independent of themselves and that it is perceivable.  If truly pressed on the matter, and with sufficiently explained concepts, I believe even the most ardent Christian will agree that our perceptions of that reality are fundamentally flawed and our knowledge acquired through these is inexorably flawed as well, but nevertheless useful to us.  These are all presuppositions that are shared between the two.

Importantly, the empiricist may require no further presuppositions to begin making claims about reality.  It is the Christian who then adds another presupposition, faith as I've defined it, on top of all that was previously shared.  And surely they must be shared.  All that empirical beliefs presuppose are processes inherent in human information processing.  If claiming to reject these presuppositions, the theist would have actually rejected objectivism, which is necessary for a belief in a "one true god".  Instead, the Christian requires MORE presuppositions than does the empiricist, thus faith-based beliefs are not on equal footing with strictly empirical beliefs.  This does not mean that having greater presuppositions inherently proves that an idea is wrong; proof was never my intention, since I am not interested in certainty.

The goal, however, is to show that "faith" is not equivalent to presuppositions, it is merely the extra layer that distinguishes, and thus theism is not an equal alternative on presuppositional grounds to empiricism.  That being said, the rule of Parsimony, or Occam's Razor, would definitely favor simpler belief systems over more elaborate ones that succeed in explaining the same reality with the fewest contradictions.  Since empiricism makes claims that are testable and repeatable (religion quite arguably does not) they are therefore externally verifiable and subject to revision.  It is through revision that empiricism achieves the fewest contradictions in its explanations of reality.

Unfortunately, this is not the magic bullet or the nail in the coffin of the argument.  Any belief system can start with whatever presuppositions it so chooses.  If you want to say that there are a thousand fundamental tenets that are necessarily unchallengeable in order to analyze your claims then that is your right, but good luck finding any points of reconciliation to bring others over to your ideologies.  If the Christian claims that faith in God is necessarily true in order to understand his viewpoint, and cannot therefore be challenged, then there are no grounds upon which you could communicate and build a consensus on reality.  The theist has used faith as a roadblock to prevent reconciliation.  Game Over.  Not surprisingly, this will be the typical result of any logic-based discussion on the existence of God with a Christian of even mild indoctrination.  But if a Christian insists that all beliefs require some element of faith, and that faith cannot therefore be criticized, he is exhibiting either a deliberate ignorance of the nuances of the meanings of the words he uses, or he is being intellectually dishonest.