The following is a regrettably brief rebuttal I recently gave to the teleological argument, or the argument from design, at a local Philosophy Meetup Group. I have since elaborated on it based on the discussion.
http://www.meetup.com/philosophy-236/events/110847252/
While this argument in its purest sense only purports a deistic god, with the advent of the Intelligent Design movement among evangelical Christians its contemporary proponents are typically theists. Thus I discuss it within the context of Christian apologetics.
The deductive form of this argument focuses on the notion that complexity predicates design in some way. Now, I've attempted to distill the argument down into what I believe are its
essential forms, but as with almost all arguments, I suspect the
definitions of the words will be the primary sticking points. After much deliberation, I believe the best definitions of the involved words, which both sides of the argument could agree with are:
Definition (apprx) Designed: to be planned by an intelligence
Definition (apprx) Natural: The opposite of designed
Definition (apprx): Complex thing: an assembly of less complex things which serves a function that is greater than the sum of its parts
During the discussion, my definition of "complex" was challenged by an advocate of the argument. He proposed the property in question was a subset of complexity, which he referred to as "specified complexity". When asked to define this distinction, the answer as I understood it was (and I hopefully paraphrase faithfully) "complexity which contains information". The purpose for this distinction I can only suppose, for the topic changed before I could respond (It was a most excellent forum and I had no place to dominate the discussion with my agenda).
That being said I offer a continuation here: What then is the definition of "information", and how is it used to distinguish between complex things that must be designed, and complex things whose natural status goes unchallenged? A snowflake was presented as a natural complex thing...I assume because it contains no "information", but what is this "information"? How does one draw the line in such a way that is not biased by their desire to draw the necessary conclusions? Design is determined by complexity, but not all complexity, and this distinction is made by information. When we stray this many layers into vague definitions a hidden bias can be easily obscured. "Information" carries the not-so subtle association with intelligence, and if this is indeed the purpose, then the circular reasoning becomes apparent. Something is designed if it is complex, but only in a way that it is complex enough to have only been created by an intelligence. I conclude that "specified complexity" is only an attempt to hide the conclusion (god exists) in the premises of the argument (more on this in a bit)
If the problem is where to draw the line of significance in complexity, then what if we don't draw the line and admit all complex things as evidence? (more on this "evidence" from induction later) I argue this is the only choice, since if some complex things can be natural, then all could, but that is the materialistic position, thus allowing for the very worldview that the "teleologist" aims to refute! Therefore, I believe the only way to present the argument is as follows:
1.) All complex things are evidence of design
2.) There exist complex things in our world which we did not design (we=known intelligences, like humans, AI's, or potentially sentient animals)
Therefore:
3.) Some unknown intelligent designer exists
And,
4.) We call that designer, God.
One of the hallmark rules of formal reasoning is that the conclusion cannot be assumed in the premises, known as "begging the question", and here we see no mention of god in either. But look closer…Premises 1 and 2 are inherently contradictory if we do not make allowance for the divine beforehand……..Now let us forgive the vague definition of complexity- indeed if we had allowed the definition for "specified complexity" the logical transgression would be doubly so.. Instead let’s focus on the shifty usage of the word designed. In premise 2, “design” ostensibly acknowledges “by known intelligences”, lest it be so bold as to beg the question outright! But it subtly requires in premise 1 that an unknown designer must exist to allow for all the non-man-made complexities we observe. If it didn’t, then only known designed things (like watches) could qualify as complex, and that contradicts premise 2. I see no other wording that would avoid this fallacy, excepting for the fallacious redefining of complexity as mentioned prior. Thus, the question is begged and the argument invalid.
The argument is also unsound. Like much of apologetics, it is an attempt to force truth on our world through pure logic alone by aiming for unfalsifiability. Through definitions like the vague word “complex” and the hidden moving goalposts of the word “designed” it hopes to hide the fact that it is not explaining any mysteries of this world, but is instead preserving them by rolling them up to a supernatural realm where mystery is useful and thus embraced. Ironically, while accusing science of lacking an explanation, the theist has only managed to propose a solution (god) that is merely an exception to explanation, but not an explanation itself. All the while and despite religion’s best efforts, Science, the human endeavor to objectively explain mysteries HAS SHOWN how complexity can come about without the need for an intelligent driving force. Evolution, as just one example, could indeed be challenged, but not by the teleological argument, as such would create one very begged question indeed. All this calls into serious question the soundness of premise 1.
So what makes the argument so persuasive to well-known apologists like William Lane Craig and Dinesh D'Souza? At this point I hope it is clear that the heart of the deductive fallacy exists in premise 1, and it is faulty inductive reasoning that allows theists to arrive at this premise unperturbed. They conclude that the presence of complexity in both man-made things and in nature is inductively indicative of both showing the features of design.
Now I’m a big fan of Induction, as was David Hume, one of its most notorious yet misattributed adversaries. In the purest sense, aside from tautologies, induction is all we really have. In life, specific examples establish a precedence from which we can assess the likelihood of accuracy of a generalization. With any luck, we can test our “theories” with additional examples to further strengthen them.
The problem is that there isn’t any actual precedence for design in naturally complex things (else we wouldn't distinguish them in the first place). A watch has precedence of design. I can tune to the Discovery Channel and see“How It’s Made” as indeed I do. But, (at the ready agreement of the theist) no mortal man has designed a dog or cat. Now we can hypothesize about the analogous nature of the complexity of natural to man-made things, but as with any application of hypothesis to reality we must adhere to the law of parsimony: accept the conclusion that explains the most facts while requiring the fewest new assumptions. And the new assumption in this case is a real doozey.
If we are to open the doors of induction, the theist will find he has just stepped through and onto a slippery slope indeed. What precedence do we have of omnipotence? Or of Omniscience? How about telepathy and the ability to exist outside of time and space? Any precedence for those? No, God is by definition without any precedence, and that makes him, by means of simple inductive reasoning, the most improbable conclusion imaginable. And since we still can’t establish the conclusion before the premises, he is the most cumbersome of new assumptions. - Poor Occam just cut himself with his own razor (he was a theist after all).
Now let’s imagine for a moment that I’ve successfully discredited the teleological argument, and indeed I think I have as have countless philosophers before me. Why are we still talking about it? ….The theist, biased by a necessitated belief, based not on reason but on deeper, subconscious influences, is NOT invested in the outcome of the argument. He has no stake in whether his logic fails or thrives. Tear down the façade and the structure remains time and time again. But to the intellectually honest, his position stands firmly on the validity of his logic and he will dutifully rise to any challenges. The intoxicating allure of an engaging debate is inevitably an illusion ending in a cheap climax and quick dismissal as the theist cries “faith” and leaves completely unaffected. *The most hardcore of apologists would never dare fall back on "faith" in an argument. Instead, they have renamed this trump card "presuppositional" apologetics" which they believe justifies them to assume God's existence in all arguments....LONG before the conclusion. This poor question has been begged to death.)
This is why I believe arguing apologetics is a red herring, a distraction, and not at the heart of humanity’s pervasive yet delusional belief in god. Much like Jesus hung out with sinners in an attempt to expose them to his ideas, it is sometimes necessary. But if the atheist believes his position best, and the dissemination of his ideas noble, I advise him to look away when the carrot of apologetics is dangled in front of him, and search instead for the social identity, the structure, and ultimately the fear, not logic, that drives theism.
Sauros Sense
Monday, April 8, 2013
Saturday, March 9, 2013
A Brief Atheist Argument - The Improbability of God
How shall we determine if something exists or not, if we have no direct perception of it? Many people believe they DO have direct perceptions of a god, and while I will save my criticisms of those perceptions for another day, the fact remains that such are not sufficient evidence for sharing their beliefs with others. For someone else to adopt your ideas, you must either provide them with the direct perceptions so they can experience it for themselves or you must provide them with reasoning that concludes that your claim is at least probable.
In actuality, I believe that even with direct perceptions, probability is the best we can ever achieve. Some things in life we can assess as 99.9% probable, functionally they are as good as proven. I can reasonably conclude that I am alive, my senses provide me with information, and the sun will rise tomorrow. (For all you philosophy geeks out there, you may have detected the flavors of the problem of induction. I'll refer you to Karl Popper's solution to the problem as I believe it mirrors my own rebuttal. Enough of that for now.) Conversely, there are those things that we can determine to be .1% probable, or alternatively, 99.9% improbable. I can reasonably conclude that I am not going to be able to fly simply by thinking happy thoughts.
So how is it then that we assess probability? Precedence. If the sun has always risen in the past, then it is at least more probable that it will again. If we recognize patterns then we can make predictions, and better yet, having our predictions verified or refuted will further strengthen our understandings of the patterns. Consider a doctor making a diagnosis. A patient with a runny nose is likely to have an allergy or a cold. Yellowing of the skin may indicate liver failure. A doctor can even draw conclusions about novel illnesses based on their similarities to existing ones. How does the doctor know this? By studying the past we can make predictions of the present and future. Using precedence to judge probability is really quite intrinsic to the way humans process information and draw conclusions, you do it all the time. Arguably, what alternatives do we have?
So what about God: is there any precedence for his divine qualities? Well of course not, he is without equal. And not just without equal, he is without comparison. In fact, God is by definition completely and utterly without precedence. Can you think of any precedence of omnipotence? How about omniscience, perfection, telepathy, eternity, or the ability to exist outside of time and space, just to name a few others? What about all the magical stories from the Bible? Noah's ark anyone? Jonah and the whale? Rising from the dead? The creation of the universe ex nihilo? Any precedence of these? It seems that God and the mythologies that surround him were created with the sole purpose of being completely unlike anything we have ever experienced. Perhaps there is a usefulness to believing in the ridiculously improbable. For while God is by definition the most improbable being conceivable, he represents an idea that is in some form or another cherished by an overwhelming majority of the human population. Isn't it interesting that we use a belief in the improbable to justify a belief in absolute certainty?
Ironically, there are plenty of ideas that most of us would reject as silly that actually have far more precedence than a god. Bigfoot: we have a fossil record of similar creatures once existing, and there is a precedence of unknown animals being discovered in relatively recent times. The same applies for the Loch Ness monster. Aliens: We have a precedence of life forming on our planet, and we now recently have a precedence of planets existing in other solar systems. You get the point. I raise the perfectly valid question: If we can conclude that bigfoot is improbable, why not God infinitely more so? Could it be because Bigfoot isn't nearly as useful?
Now I realize that in my first paragraph I promised not to criticize people's personal revelations of god, but allow me to offer just this one tease: We have plenty of precedence of people "feeling" presences that aren't real, or "hearing" voices that are nothing more than illusions. A couple classes in psychology will suffice as a primer in the gullibility of the human mind. Or you need merely to look at the plethora of competing world religions to see that people can receive a personal revelation of a god that doesn't exist from sources that are hardly divine. Why then should it be reasonable for a theist to conclude that his personal revelations are any different from these existing explanations which are supported by plenty of precedence, but instead adopt the one explanation that is the quintessence of improbability? If artificial revelation is indistinguishable from divine revelation, and we have precedence for artificial revelation but none for divinity, how then can the theist reasonably claim evidence of god?
Plenty O' Comments for this article so be sure to read them, too!
In actuality, I believe that even with direct perceptions, probability is the best we can ever achieve. Some things in life we can assess as 99.9% probable, functionally they are as good as proven. I can reasonably conclude that I am alive, my senses provide me with information, and the sun will rise tomorrow. (For all you philosophy geeks out there, you may have detected the flavors of the problem of induction. I'll refer you to Karl Popper's solution to the problem as I believe it mirrors my own rebuttal. Enough of that for now.) Conversely, there are those things that we can determine to be .1% probable, or alternatively, 99.9% improbable. I can reasonably conclude that I am not going to be able to fly simply by thinking happy thoughts.
So how is it then that we assess probability? Precedence. If the sun has always risen in the past, then it is at least more probable that it will again. If we recognize patterns then we can make predictions, and better yet, having our predictions verified or refuted will further strengthen our understandings of the patterns. Consider a doctor making a diagnosis. A patient with a runny nose is likely to have an allergy or a cold. Yellowing of the skin may indicate liver failure. A doctor can even draw conclusions about novel illnesses based on their similarities to existing ones. How does the doctor know this? By studying the past we can make predictions of the present and future. Using precedence to judge probability is really quite intrinsic to the way humans process information and draw conclusions, you do it all the time. Arguably, what alternatives do we have?
So what about God: is there any precedence for his divine qualities? Well of course not, he is without equal. And not just without equal, he is without comparison. In fact, God is by definition completely and utterly without precedence. Can you think of any precedence of omnipotence? How about omniscience, perfection, telepathy, eternity, or the ability to exist outside of time and space, just to name a few others? What about all the magical stories from the Bible? Noah's ark anyone? Jonah and the whale? Rising from the dead? The creation of the universe ex nihilo? Any precedence of these? It seems that God and the mythologies that surround him were created with the sole purpose of being completely unlike anything we have ever experienced. Perhaps there is a usefulness to believing in the ridiculously improbable. For while God is by definition the most improbable being conceivable, he represents an idea that is in some form or another cherished by an overwhelming majority of the human population. Isn't it interesting that we use a belief in the improbable to justify a belief in absolute certainty?
Ironically, there are plenty of ideas that most of us would reject as silly that actually have far more precedence than a god. Bigfoot: we have a fossil record of similar creatures once existing, and there is a precedence of unknown animals being discovered in relatively recent times. The same applies for the Loch Ness monster. Aliens: We have a precedence of life forming on our planet, and we now recently have a precedence of planets existing in other solar systems. You get the point. I raise the perfectly valid question: If we can conclude that bigfoot is improbable, why not God infinitely more so? Could it be because Bigfoot isn't nearly as useful?
Now I realize that in my first paragraph I promised not to criticize people's personal revelations of god, but allow me to offer just this one tease: We have plenty of precedence of people "feeling" presences that aren't real, or "hearing" voices that are nothing more than illusions. A couple classes in psychology will suffice as a primer in the gullibility of the human mind. Or you need merely to look at the plethora of competing world religions to see that people can receive a personal revelation of a god that doesn't exist from sources that are hardly divine. Why then should it be reasonable for a theist to conclude that his personal revelations are any different from these existing explanations which are supported by plenty of precedence, but instead adopt the one explanation that is the quintessence of improbability? If artificial revelation is indistinguishable from divine revelation, and we have precedence for artificial revelation but none for divinity, how then can the theist reasonably claim evidence of god?
Plenty O' Comments for this article so be sure to read them, too!
Where is the Burden of Proof?
If you have any familiarity with the atheist position you will recognize immediately the importance of the argument for Burden of Proof, and you will also find it shocking when I conclude that it's not a terribly good argument.
To describe it in brief, the person making a claim carries the burden of showing why that claim should be accepted. The implication this has for the existence of god is that the atheist believes the theist has not yet provided any compelling evidence to support his position, and when pushed on the matter, the theist almost always resorts to the defense that in order to believe in god one must have faith. This deference of evidence is quite unacceptable to any self respecting empiricist, which atheists typically are, and thus without having met the burden of proof the theist's claims of the existence of the divine are rejected.
Now I agree with all of that. Excepting for the fact that in reality, conversations about philosophy are never that cut and dry. A common rebuttal to this argument from the theist is "you can't prove God doesn't exist!" and this has been referred to as shifting the burden of proof. How valid an argument can this be?
To see why it is a problem, consider the claim "Leprechauns hide a pot of gold at the end of a rainbow" And supplement the already familiar definition of a leprechaun so that all leprechauns can detect when a person is nearby and can hide in such a way that they are undetectable (if they so choose). Now a person could claim to have seen a leprechaun, maybe even caught a glimpse of his pot o' gold, but where is the evidence? Oh, well the leprechaun didn't want me to catch him so he ran off before I could get his picture (and so forth). The whole notion of the leprechaun has been carefully constructed so that no evidence against them could ever be presented, and the only evidence in support of their magical ways is anecdotal at best.
So what if a devout leprechaunist came to you and told you their story? No one in their right mind would believe them without a photograph or a clover-embossed gold token. Could we be so bold as to expect an actual leprechaun in a cage? So it should be equally obvious to us that when the leprechaunist insists you prove the little green bearded men DON'T exist, he is being entirely unreasonable. Right?
Shouldn't you be able to offer some explanations for why you don't believe in leprechauns? How about the fact that tiny little men have never been discovered? Or our extensive knowledge concerning the physical properties that govern the creation of rainbows (since they are optical illusions and never physically reach the ground, how could a pot o' gold be located there?). You explain that the physiology of the human body, even when shrunk to leprechaun scale would not allow a creature the speed and senses necessary to evade detection as described by the leprechaun claims. I'm sure your reasons for doubting could fill a substantial list if considered at length.
But the leprechaunist would say, "that's not proof!", and indeed it isn't. Thus this takes us to the point in the argument where I follow a different logical path than most of my atheist peers. Enter: semantics. What is "proof"? Is it even something worth pursuing in the context of reality? If you've read my previous posts you'll know by now that I make the important distinction between proof and evidence as I distinguish between certainty and uncertainty, and that all claims of knowledge about the real world carry with them some inescapable allowance of uncertainty. So as I define the words (necessarily, to clarify concepts) nothing in this world can be conclusively proven to the level of certainty that people are accustomed to thinking in.
Therefore, it's better referred to as the Burden of Evidence. Am I just being nitpicky? Nope. See, while proof can be considered an objective establishment of truth, one that is valid independent of the person receiving it, evidence is not. Convincing evidence must integrate into a person's existing body of knowledge to be of any persuasion.
Is this not what all transference of ideas ultimately boils down to? Ideas about the world in which we live may be objectively right or wrong, but we'll never know which for sure. That's the hard knocks of not being omniscient. The function of communication instead is to facilitate the acceptance or rejection of ideas, and evidence (perceptions and ideas that support a new idea) is the means by which we accomplish this noble task.
So when we argue about a failure to meet the Burden of Proof (evidence), we haven't considered the complete picture. If evidence is dependent on the person receiving it, then evidence is a judgement. And there cannot be a judgement without a judge. Each of us carries our own burden of proof, the product of all our knowledge, experiences, and past judgements. So when an atheist says that the theist has not met the burden of proof, what he mean is that the theist has not met HIS burden of proof. From the theist's point of view, many others have considered his claims of god to be justified, and he may genuinely have trouble understanding why the atheist does not.
If any discussion is to continue, which I believe it should, the atheist is going to need to explain himself. Why are the theist's reasons insufficient? Can some standards of evidence be agreed upon? Probably not, but it's worth a try. What understandings of reality does the atheist hold valid that prevent him from accepting the theist's claims? He surely has some, so why not divulge them? Just simply asserting that your burden of proof has not been met is metaphorically equivalent to sticking your fingers in your ears. That's fine if you're avoiding a conversation, but it doesn't say much for your intelligence.
This is NOT to say that the theist is justified in shifting the burden of proof. If you've developed an idea which is by definition irrefutable (and certainly theism fits the bill), it would be irresponsible of you to expect someone else to perform the impossible in order to counter your claims. Just as the leprechaun example is irrefutable (those tricky little Irishmen), this doesn't make the claim any more valid. In fact, irrefutable claims are quite easy to construct - any supernatural claim for example, or one that relies upon knowledge that is unattainable. Who has the time or the desire to futilely try to disprove any of them, let alone all of them?
My point is this: Calling upon the burden of proof shouldn't be the "end all" for discussions on the existence of god. Let's stop focusing on proof, as if anything could be shown conclusively, and let's continue down the path of sharing ideas. There is certainly no shortage of them. Am I too naive to believe that we may eventually agree that some of these ideas match our perceptions of reality better than others?
To describe it in brief, the person making a claim carries the burden of showing why that claim should be accepted. The implication this has for the existence of god is that the atheist believes the theist has not yet provided any compelling evidence to support his position, and when pushed on the matter, the theist almost always resorts to the defense that in order to believe in god one must have faith. This deference of evidence is quite unacceptable to any self respecting empiricist, which atheists typically are, and thus without having met the burden of proof the theist's claims of the existence of the divine are rejected.
Now I agree with all of that. Excepting for the fact that in reality, conversations about philosophy are never that cut and dry. A common rebuttal to this argument from the theist is "you can't prove God doesn't exist!" and this has been referred to as shifting the burden of proof. How valid an argument can this be?
To see why it is a problem, consider the claim "Leprechauns hide a pot of gold at the end of a rainbow" And supplement the already familiar definition of a leprechaun so that all leprechauns can detect when a person is nearby and can hide in such a way that they are undetectable (if they so choose). Now a person could claim to have seen a leprechaun, maybe even caught a glimpse of his pot o' gold, but where is the evidence? Oh, well the leprechaun didn't want me to catch him so he ran off before I could get his picture (and so forth). The whole notion of the leprechaun has been carefully constructed so that no evidence against them could ever be presented, and the only evidence in support of their magical ways is anecdotal at best.
So what if a devout leprechaunist came to you and told you their story? No one in their right mind would believe them without a photograph or a clover-embossed gold token. Could we be so bold as to expect an actual leprechaun in a cage? So it should be equally obvious to us that when the leprechaunist insists you prove the little green bearded men DON'T exist, he is being entirely unreasonable. Right?
Shouldn't you be able to offer some explanations for why you don't believe in leprechauns? How about the fact that tiny little men have never been discovered? Or our extensive knowledge concerning the physical properties that govern the creation of rainbows (since they are optical illusions and never physically reach the ground, how could a pot o' gold be located there?). You explain that the physiology of the human body, even when shrunk to leprechaun scale would not allow a creature the speed and senses necessary to evade detection as described by the leprechaun claims. I'm sure your reasons for doubting could fill a substantial list if considered at length.
But the leprechaunist would say, "that's not proof!", and indeed it isn't. Thus this takes us to the point in the argument where I follow a different logical path than most of my atheist peers. Enter: semantics. What is "proof"? Is it even something worth pursuing in the context of reality? If you've read my previous posts you'll know by now that I make the important distinction between proof and evidence as I distinguish between certainty and uncertainty, and that all claims of knowledge about the real world carry with them some inescapable allowance of uncertainty. So as I define the words (necessarily, to clarify concepts) nothing in this world can be conclusively proven to the level of certainty that people are accustomed to thinking in.
Therefore, it's better referred to as the Burden of Evidence. Am I just being nitpicky? Nope. See, while proof can be considered an objective establishment of truth, one that is valid independent of the person receiving it, evidence is not. Convincing evidence must integrate into a person's existing body of knowledge to be of any persuasion.
Is this not what all transference of ideas ultimately boils down to? Ideas about the world in which we live may be objectively right or wrong, but we'll never know which for sure. That's the hard knocks of not being omniscient. The function of communication instead is to facilitate the acceptance or rejection of ideas, and evidence (perceptions and ideas that support a new idea) is the means by which we accomplish this noble task.
So when we argue about a failure to meet the Burden of Proof (evidence), we haven't considered the complete picture. If evidence is dependent on the person receiving it, then evidence is a judgement. And there cannot be a judgement without a judge. Each of us carries our own burden of proof, the product of all our knowledge, experiences, and past judgements. So when an atheist says that the theist has not met the burden of proof, what he mean is that the theist has not met HIS burden of proof. From the theist's point of view, many others have considered his claims of god to be justified, and he may genuinely have trouble understanding why the atheist does not.
If any discussion is to continue, which I believe it should, the atheist is going to need to explain himself. Why are the theist's reasons insufficient? Can some standards of evidence be agreed upon? Probably not, but it's worth a try. What understandings of reality does the atheist hold valid that prevent him from accepting the theist's claims? He surely has some, so why not divulge them? Just simply asserting that your burden of proof has not been met is metaphorically equivalent to sticking your fingers in your ears. That's fine if you're avoiding a conversation, but it doesn't say much for your intelligence.
This is NOT to say that the theist is justified in shifting the burden of proof. If you've developed an idea which is by definition irrefutable (and certainly theism fits the bill), it would be irresponsible of you to expect someone else to perform the impossible in order to counter your claims. Just as the leprechaun example is irrefutable (those tricky little Irishmen), this doesn't make the claim any more valid. In fact, irrefutable claims are quite easy to construct - any supernatural claim for example, or one that relies upon knowledge that is unattainable. Who has the time or the desire to futilely try to disprove any of them, let alone all of them?
My point is this: Calling upon the burden of proof shouldn't be the "end all" for discussions on the existence of god. Let's stop focusing on proof, as if anything could be shown conclusively, and let's continue down the path of sharing ideas. There is certainly no shortage of them. Am I too naive to believe that we may eventually agree that some of these ideas match our perceptions of reality better than others?
Thursday, February 28, 2013
Faith and Presuppositional Apologetics
An argument I heard recently in defense of theism was the declaration that all beliefs, including beliefs based strictly on externally verifiable evidence (empiricism), require faith to believe. As is so often the case in philosophical discussions, semantics are the first stumbling block towards establishing common ground, and this is no exception. The theist also makes the critically invalid epistemological assumption that the opposing party claims 100% certainty in their belief. (see previous post on agnostic vs. gnostic knowledge)
DEFINING FAITH
First, on the subject of the definition of the word "faith". I have attempted to define faith in a way that is concise and consistent with English dictionary definitions. My goal is not to redefine the word to suit my needs, but rather to differentiate the nuanced contexts in which the word can be used and the implications thereof. We must always understand that one word can have many similar meanings, and it would be a fallacy to claim use of one meaning of a word while using it in the context of another. However Christianity makes the even larger fallacy of redefining the word so that its definition is so vague that the contexts in which it can be appropriately used begin to blur together.
The biblical definition of "faith" is as follows: "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen" (Hebrews 11:1, KJV). Interesting. This doesn't match any of the definitions I've provided in my previous post so what exactly does this mean? Let's break it down, but beware, like many passages in the bible, it is intentionally vague and open to myriad interpretations.
"The substance of things hoped for" On closer consideration, I can't see how this section of the biblical definition of the word is even necessary, at least not from an epistemological sense. The closest I can conclude is that it is roughly equivalent to "those things that we want to believe". This sounds a lot like putting the cart before the horse. If you already know what you want to believe BEFORE you have the reason to believe it, then you are definitely not following the rules of evidence based belief. In evidence based belief, we can certainly make predictions about the perceptions we expect, but the belief is still predicated by the actual existence of that evidence. In other words, if I'm "hoping for" evidence to support the belief that I can fly by flapping my arms, I must admit it impossible when I fall flat on my face. Thus, since the Christian's argument is that all belief systems require their definition of the word faith, they are already on the wrong track.
"the evidence of things not seen" This is the part that is epistemologically relevant, and similar to the definitions I've proposed in my previous post. The word evidence here is used liberally, and quite arguably incorrectly, so let us replace it with a more neutral synonym we can all agree on. "information that forms the reason for believing". Why can't we use the word "evidence"? Because "evidence" to an empiricist is necessarily external to the believer. It must be able to be perceived by others in an approximately equal way. To the empiricist, a rock is evidence since it can be held by anyone and their perceptions of it will be more or less uniform (it's grey, hard, cracks with a hammer, contains recognizable patterns, etc). A feeling, however, is not evidence. A memory is not evidence. These things are considered anecdotal. While they are not necessarily incorrect, because they can not be experienced external to the individual that maintains them they do not count as evidence. After all, if the "things" had been "seen" then this definition wouldn't apply anyways. Since our goal here is to gain common ground in semantics, let us adopt my proposed clarification of the wording above, "The information that forms the reason for believing things not seen"
Unfortunately, my pursuit for clarification requires a second, and I believe equally agreeable, alteration to the definition above. Since vision is not the only sense that is available to us, let us rephrase the definition as such: Faith is "the information that forms the reason for believing in things not directly perceived" My goal here is not to confuse or to alter the meaning of this definition, merely to clarify it so that it can be analyzed on equal footing by both the theist and the strict empiricist. If the definition sounds overly vague, - that's because it is and always was.
This definition could be used in almost any situation where an individual's belief requires perceptions that are not readily available to them...a situation we regularly find ourselves in. But not all information is created equal. How would you rate the likelihood of the following sources of information to be accurate? "A doctor telling you you have cancer; uncle Jim insisting that the president is a communist; an encyclopedia describing the events of WWII; an astrophysicist detailing the prevailing theories describing the origins of the universe; a best friend claiming to have found a miracle pill for weight loss; an ancient text that claims to be the infallible source of truth. The point of similarity is that each of these constitutes an indirect source of information. While not as valuable as direct perception, this is better than no information at all, although surely most people would agree that the best friend and uncle Jim are probably full of shit. As an atheist, I extend this assessment to the ancient text as well, and to anyone or anything claiming infallibility.
This is where one of my definitions of faith establishes a crucial distinction that the biblical definition does not. "Faith" as a synonym for "trust" can be defined as belief based upon indirect information from a source the individual considers trustworthy. Does the Bible count here? Interestingly, in order to be considered trustworthy, the source of information being trusted must already be known to exist. One can not "trust" that God exists merely upon the second hand information being presented to us by the very god we aim to prove, as this is clearly circular reasoning. The same could equally be said about any deity figure. You must already believe God exists in order to trust in him, therefore you can not establish god's existence by saying you trust in the writings of bible. This definition does not match the usage of the word "faith" when a Christian says "I have faith that God exists because I believe his holy word is true"
While belief based on second hand information does fit into the biblical definition of the word faith, it is different from another context in which an individual may claim "information that forms the reason for believing in things not directly perceived" If direct perception is not possible ("things unseen") and indirect perception is also not possible (2nd hand information), what's left? Zero perceptions. To the fervent Christian, true faith does not require any confirmation of the belief's validity, in fact maintaining belief in exactly this situation is revered with promises of reward. Herein lies my second major definition of the word "faith". Paraphrased to match the context of the definitions at play here, it is: "the information that forms the reason for believing in things neither directly nor indirectly perceived". It is tantamount to information that is simply asserted.
While this is not a very flattering distinction, it is nonetheless necessary. The biblical definition of faith is too vague. Even if I had not attempted to clarify this definition, it's lack of specificity should be clear. Sadly, the authors of the book of Hebrews knew what they were doing when redefining "faith" to blur the lines between reasonable information gathering and the foundations of their beliefs. I can only hope that I have been successful in driving a semantic wedge between these two concepts by differentiating between them clearly. The purpose behind this distinction should be equally obvious. Only in faith based belief systems are such assertions of validity made without any call to direct or indirect perceptions.
CERTAINTY (revisited)
Why would the theist even require such assertions in the first place? Why in the world does such a way of thinking even exist that we would need to define faith it at all? The answer is "Certainty". Humans have always had a need for certainty. In the depths of our historical ignorance we've often resorted to inventing knowledge to fill in the gaps where certainty has been absent. Of those inventions, the stories that we no longer have a need for we call mythology - those that we do we call religion.
The theist claims and indeed requires the certainty that gnostic knowledge provides, something which is unachievable through imperfect perceptions which are the results of our flawed human senses. The theist sees a way around this by purporting access to information that is not dependent on these perceptions. But because the theist assumes that his opponent requires this same level of certainty, he makes the error in concluding that unevidenced truth assertions, or faith, is required for belief in anything at all. The argument completely falls apart if the empiricist is willing to admit that he can not know anything with perfect certainty, thus the requirement for faith is nullified - and honestly so.
So is that the end of it? Is faith (as distinguished from empirical trust) unique to religious beliefs, and thus open to criticism? Some Christian Apologists have one final philosophical trick up their sleeves. The concept of presupposition.
PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS
Much in the same way that a relativist works from a completely different foundation of determining truth than an objectivist, and thus the two are proclaimed to be irreconcilable, the Presuppositional Apologist attests that theism can not even be debated with dissenters because it is based upon unchallengeable assumptions necessary for that worldview. These are known as presuppositions, and every epistemological viewpoint asserts some. These apologists have taken the "everything requires faith" argument and dressed it up with new, seemingly valid, philosophical terminology. Instead of "faith" it is presuppositions that all beliefs require. Ironically, all this merely accomplishes is putting all beliefs on equal footing, a position that the theist surely does not honestly maintain, and I thusly question the apologist's motivations and integrity
But just how different are the presuppositions of the theist and the atheist? Not as different as you might initially think. While we don't agree on the weight that should be given to empirical evidence vs. asserted truths, mainstream Chrisitans and Atheists are almost always both Objectivists, the only exceptions being more likely in the latter. What this means is that although they disagree on the qualities of reality, they do nonetheless agree that one exists that is independent of themselves and that it is perceivable. If truly pressed on the matter, and with sufficiently explained concepts, I believe even the most ardent Christian will agree that our perceptions of that reality are fundamentally flawed and our knowledge acquired through these is inexorably flawed as well, but nevertheless useful to us. These are all presuppositions that are shared between the two.
Importantly, the empiricist may require no further presuppositions to begin making claims about reality. It is the Christian who then adds another presupposition, faith as I've defined it, on top of all that was previously shared. And surely they must be shared. All that empirical beliefs presuppose are processes inherent in human information processing. If claiming to reject these presuppositions, the theist would have actually rejected objectivism, which is necessary for a belief in a "one true god". Instead, the Christian requires MORE presuppositions than does the empiricist, thus faith-based beliefs are not on equal footing with strictly empirical beliefs. This does not mean that having greater presuppositions inherently proves that an idea is wrong; proof was never my intention, since I am not interested in certainty.
The goal, however, is to show that "faith" is not equivalent to presuppositions, it is merely the extra layer that distinguishes, and thus theism is not an equal alternative on presuppositional grounds to empiricism. That being said, the rule of Parsimony, or Occam's Razor, would definitely favor simpler belief systems over more elaborate ones that succeed in explaining the same reality with the fewest contradictions. Since empiricism makes claims that are testable and repeatable (religion quite arguably does not) they are therefore externally verifiable and subject to revision. It is through revision that empiricism achieves the fewest contradictions in its explanations of reality.
Unfortunately, this is not the magic bullet or the nail in the coffin of the argument. Any belief system can start with whatever presuppositions it so chooses. If you want to say that there are a thousand fundamental tenets that are necessarily unchallengeable in order to analyze your claims then that is your right, but good luck finding any points of reconciliation to bring others over to your ideologies. If the Christian claims that faith in God is necessarily true in order to understand his viewpoint, and cannot therefore be challenged, then there are no grounds upon which you could communicate and build a consensus on reality. The theist has used faith as a roadblock to prevent reconciliation. Game Over. Not surprisingly, this will be the typical result of any logic-based discussion on the existence of God with a Christian of even mild indoctrination. But if a Christian insists that all beliefs require some element of faith, and that faith cannot therefore be criticized, he is exhibiting either a deliberate ignorance of the nuances of the meanings of the words he uses, or he is being intellectually dishonest.
DEFINING FAITH
First, on the subject of the definition of the word "faith". I have attempted to define faith in a way that is concise and consistent with English dictionary definitions. My goal is not to redefine the word to suit my needs, but rather to differentiate the nuanced contexts in which the word can be used and the implications thereof. We must always understand that one word can have many similar meanings, and it would be a fallacy to claim use of one meaning of a word while using it in the context of another. However Christianity makes the even larger fallacy of redefining the word so that its definition is so vague that the contexts in which it can be appropriately used begin to blur together.
The biblical definition of "faith" is as follows: "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen" (Hebrews 11:1, KJV). Interesting. This doesn't match any of the definitions I've provided in my previous post so what exactly does this mean? Let's break it down, but beware, like many passages in the bible, it is intentionally vague and open to myriad interpretations.
"The substance of things hoped for" On closer consideration, I can't see how this section of the biblical definition of the word is even necessary, at least not from an epistemological sense. The closest I can conclude is that it is roughly equivalent to "those things that we want to believe". This sounds a lot like putting the cart before the horse. If you already know what you want to believe BEFORE you have the reason to believe it, then you are definitely not following the rules of evidence based belief. In evidence based belief, we can certainly make predictions about the perceptions we expect, but the belief is still predicated by the actual existence of that evidence. In other words, if I'm "hoping for" evidence to support the belief that I can fly by flapping my arms, I must admit it impossible when I fall flat on my face. Thus, since the Christian's argument is that all belief systems require their definition of the word faith, they are already on the wrong track.
"the evidence of things not seen" This is the part that is epistemologically relevant, and similar to the definitions I've proposed in my previous post. The word evidence here is used liberally, and quite arguably incorrectly, so let us replace it with a more neutral synonym we can all agree on. "information that forms the reason for believing". Why can't we use the word "evidence"? Because "evidence" to an empiricist is necessarily external to the believer. It must be able to be perceived by others in an approximately equal way. To the empiricist, a rock is evidence since it can be held by anyone and their perceptions of it will be more or less uniform (it's grey, hard, cracks with a hammer, contains recognizable patterns, etc). A feeling, however, is not evidence. A memory is not evidence. These things are considered anecdotal. While they are not necessarily incorrect, because they can not be experienced external to the individual that maintains them they do not count as evidence. After all, if the "things" had been "seen" then this definition wouldn't apply anyways. Since our goal here is to gain common ground in semantics, let us adopt my proposed clarification of the wording above, "The information that forms the reason for believing things not seen"
Unfortunately, my pursuit for clarification requires a second, and I believe equally agreeable, alteration to the definition above. Since vision is not the only sense that is available to us, let us rephrase the definition as such: Faith is "the information that forms the reason for believing in things not directly perceived" My goal here is not to confuse or to alter the meaning of this definition, merely to clarify it so that it can be analyzed on equal footing by both the theist and the strict empiricist. If the definition sounds overly vague, - that's because it is and always was.
This definition could be used in almost any situation where an individual's belief requires perceptions that are not readily available to them...a situation we regularly find ourselves in. But not all information is created equal. How would you rate the likelihood of the following sources of information to be accurate? "A doctor telling you you have cancer; uncle Jim insisting that the president is a communist; an encyclopedia describing the events of WWII; an astrophysicist detailing the prevailing theories describing the origins of the universe; a best friend claiming to have found a miracle pill for weight loss; an ancient text that claims to be the infallible source of truth. The point of similarity is that each of these constitutes an indirect source of information. While not as valuable as direct perception, this is better than no information at all, although surely most people would agree that the best friend and uncle Jim are probably full of shit. As an atheist, I extend this assessment to the ancient text as well, and to anyone or anything claiming infallibility.
This is where one of my definitions of faith establishes a crucial distinction that the biblical definition does not. "Faith" as a synonym for "trust" can be defined as belief based upon indirect information from a source the individual considers trustworthy. Does the Bible count here? Interestingly, in order to be considered trustworthy, the source of information being trusted must already be known to exist. One can not "trust" that God exists merely upon the second hand information being presented to us by the very god we aim to prove, as this is clearly circular reasoning. The same could equally be said about any deity figure. You must already believe God exists in order to trust in him, therefore you can not establish god's existence by saying you trust in the writings of bible. This definition does not match the usage of the word "faith" when a Christian says "I have faith that God exists because I believe his holy word is true"
While belief based on second hand information does fit into the biblical definition of the word faith, it is different from another context in which an individual may claim "information that forms the reason for believing in things not directly perceived" If direct perception is not possible ("things unseen") and indirect perception is also not possible (2nd hand information), what's left? Zero perceptions. To the fervent Christian, true faith does not require any confirmation of the belief's validity, in fact maintaining belief in exactly this situation is revered with promises of reward. Herein lies my second major definition of the word "faith". Paraphrased to match the context of the definitions at play here, it is: "the information that forms the reason for believing in things neither directly nor indirectly perceived". It is tantamount to information that is simply asserted.
While this is not a very flattering distinction, it is nonetheless necessary. The biblical definition of faith is too vague. Even if I had not attempted to clarify this definition, it's lack of specificity should be clear. Sadly, the authors of the book of Hebrews knew what they were doing when redefining "faith" to blur the lines between reasonable information gathering and the foundations of their beliefs. I can only hope that I have been successful in driving a semantic wedge between these two concepts by differentiating between them clearly. The purpose behind this distinction should be equally obvious. Only in faith based belief systems are such assertions of validity made without any call to direct or indirect perceptions.
CERTAINTY (revisited)
Why would the theist even require such assertions in the first place? Why in the world does such a way of thinking even exist that we would need to define faith it at all? The answer is "Certainty". Humans have always had a need for certainty. In the depths of our historical ignorance we've often resorted to inventing knowledge to fill in the gaps where certainty has been absent. Of those inventions, the stories that we no longer have a need for we call mythology - those that we do we call religion.
The theist claims and indeed requires the certainty that gnostic knowledge provides, something which is unachievable through imperfect perceptions which are the results of our flawed human senses. The theist sees a way around this by purporting access to information that is not dependent on these perceptions. But because the theist assumes that his opponent requires this same level of certainty, he makes the error in concluding that unevidenced truth assertions, or faith, is required for belief in anything at all. The argument completely falls apart if the empiricist is willing to admit that he can not know anything with perfect certainty, thus the requirement for faith is nullified - and honestly so.
So is that the end of it? Is faith (as distinguished from empirical trust) unique to religious beliefs, and thus open to criticism? Some Christian Apologists have one final philosophical trick up their sleeves. The concept of presupposition.
PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS
Much in the same way that a relativist works from a completely different foundation of determining truth than an objectivist, and thus the two are proclaimed to be irreconcilable, the Presuppositional Apologist attests that theism can not even be debated with dissenters because it is based upon unchallengeable assumptions necessary for that worldview. These are known as presuppositions, and every epistemological viewpoint asserts some. These apologists have taken the "everything requires faith" argument and dressed it up with new, seemingly valid, philosophical terminology. Instead of "faith" it is presuppositions that all beliefs require. Ironically, all this merely accomplishes is putting all beliefs on equal footing, a position that the theist surely does not honestly maintain, and I thusly question the apologist's motivations and integrity
But just how different are the presuppositions of the theist and the atheist? Not as different as you might initially think. While we don't agree on the weight that should be given to empirical evidence vs. asserted truths, mainstream Chrisitans and Atheists are almost always both Objectivists, the only exceptions being more likely in the latter. What this means is that although they disagree on the qualities of reality, they do nonetheless agree that one exists that is independent of themselves and that it is perceivable. If truly pressed on the matter, and with sufficiently explained concepts, I believe even the most ardent Christian will agree that our perceptions of that reality are fundamentally flawed and our knowledge acquired through these is inexorably flawed as well, but nevertheless useful to us. These are all presuppositions that are shared between the two.
Importantly, the empiricist may require no further presuppositions to begin making claims about reality. It is the Christian who then adds another presupposition, faith as I've defined it, on top of all that was previously shared. And surely they must be shared. All that empirical beliefs presuppose are processes inherent in human information processing. If claiming to reject these presuppositions, the theist would have actually rejected objectivism, which is necessary for a belief in a "one true god". Instead, the Christian requires MORE presuppositions than does the empiricist, thus faith-based beliefs are not on equal footing with strictly empirical beliefs. This does not mean that having greater presuppositions inherently proves that an idea is wrong; proof was never my intention, since I am not interested in certainty.
The goal, however, is to show that "faith" is not equivalent to presuppositions, it is merely the extra layer that distinguishes, and thus theism is not an equal alternative on presuppositional grounds to empiricism. That being said, the rule of Parsimony, or Occam's Razor, would definitely favor simpler belief systems over more elaborate ones that succeed in explaining the same reality with the fewest contradictions. Since empiricism makes claims that are testable and repeatable (religion quite arguably does not) they are therefore externally verifiable and subject to revision. It is through revision that empiricism achieves the fewest contradictions in its explanations of reality.
Unfortunately, this is not the magic bullet or the nail in the coffin of the argument. Any belief system can start with whatever presuppositions it so chooses. If you want to say that there are a thousand fundamental tenets that are necessarily unchallengeable in order to analyze your claims then that is your right, but good luck finding any points of reconciliation to bring others over to your ideologies. If the Christian claims that faith in God is necessarily true in order to understand his viewpoint, and cannot therefore be challenged, then there are no grounds upon which you could communicate and build a consensus on reality. The theist has used faith as a roadblock to prevent reconciliation. Game Over. Not surprisingly, this will be the typical result of any logic-based discussion on the existence of God with a Christian of even mild indoctrination. But if a Christian insists that all beliefs require some element of faith, and that faith cannot therefore be criticized, he is exhibiting either a deliberate ignorance of the nuances of the meanings of the words he uses, or he is being intellectually dishonest.
Saturday, February 23, 2013
How do we know what we know?
EPISTEMOLOGY
At the core of any thought invoking discussion on the existence of god is the question of how do we know what we know. In philosophy this topic is called epistemology. Now there are many prevailing ideas concerning epistemology and some of them are completely irreconcilable with each other which can cause insurmountable difficulties in coming to an agreement on intense philosophical ideas. As an overview and at the risk of over simplifying the matter, I'm going to propose that most of these ideas can be boiled down into two main competing schools of thought: Relativism and Objectivism. Unfortunately, a relativist and an objectivist will most likely be unable to agree with each other at a core fundamental level and a consensus will be impossible.
Relativism: Relativism is the declaration that all ideas, regardless of their incompatibility, should be considered equally valid. Notice that relativism avoids making any declaration of "truth". Instead it carefully circumvents truth by focusing on a person's right to believe what they want to. This may take the form of complete ideological relativism, but more often it can be seen as a diplomatic relativism, wherein the individual adopts relativistic stances on various controversial issues simply for the sake of diffusing conflict and tension.
Objectivism, then, is the declaration and pursuit of a truth that is independent of the believer. The problem that the objectivist is faced with, and which the relativist has cleverly avoided, is the question of how we determine this "truth" that is out there. If two people hold conflicting ideas about a subject how can they reconcile these ideas into one coherent perspective? Rather than elaborate on the myriad forms of truth that people have fought for over the millennia, I will put forth my own conclusions in regards to epistemology for the reader's evaluation. I ask for some allowance to slightly redefine certain words from their typical usage for the purposes of clarifying my ideas.
GNOSTIC Vs. AGNOSTIC TRUTH
There are two basic forms of truth that we can deliberate over: Gnostic truths and Agnostic truths. Eradicate from your mind any preconceived notions of the meaning of the word "agnostic", it does not necessitate a belief, or lack thereof, in the existence of God. Gnostic simply means "knowledge", typically used to implicate certainty, and agnostic therefore means without. "Gnostic" truths are those which we are absolutely sure of and "agnostic" truths are those where we can't possibly be sure of. Why can't we possibly be sure of some truths? Because human beings have long struggled with the obvious limitations of our own imperfections. Perceptions vary and complete information often remains elusive. Thus we are forced to come to conclusions about the world around us that are imperfect but nonetheless necessary. It can be said then that with all agnostic beliefs there is always a certain allowance for error, regardless of whether or not we want to acknowledge it.
So where is the line between gnostic and agnostic truth drawn? If we consider that the source of fallibility in agnostic truth is the imperfection in human perception then we must conclude that any truth as it pertains to the world that we perceive is agnostic. We must allow for some margin of error, often a greater one than we prefer. So what does that classification leave us for the realm of gnostic truth? Not much. It leaves us with a form of truth called tautologies, essentially something that is true because we've defined it to be that way. For example, 2+2=4. Why? because that's how we've defined "2" and "+" and "=" and "4". It is tautologically necessary that 2+2=4. How we apply these human created concepts to the real world determines their usefulness and is also subject to error. Tautological truths are very useful in the realm of mathematics and also Law. We can use the definition of a law (a human construct) to determine what it means. Or philosophy and logic itself can be considered tautological, but again, it is how we apply these ideas to the real world that takes us back into the realm of agnostic truth.
EVALUATING A CLAIM
In evaluating a gnostic or agnostic claim of truth, the processes are very similar, as are the possible outcomes. In a gnostic claim, we simply need to take the definition of the idea(s) in question, apply agreed upon forms of logic and reasoning, and when a valid conclusion is reached we call this a "proof". In an agnostic claim, we start with perceptions of the real world, apply agreed upon forms of logic and reasoning, and when a valid conclusion is reached it is called "evidence". Either way, one of three positions can be taken upon being presented with a complete "proof" or "evidence" of a claim.
1.) Acceptance of the claim: it is integrated into existing understanding of reality.
2.) Ignorance of the claim: the proof/evidence was not understood and could not be evaluated
3.) Rejection of the claim: the proof/evidence was understood but the definition and/or reasoning behind it are still in conflict with previously held beliefs.
Some examples of this for an agnostic claim are as follows:
CLAIM: "It is snowing outside" but you are unable to go to a window to observe directly.
Perception: since we are unable to observe directly, what exactly can we perceive? Let's say that it's January and there was a prior forecast for snow that day. This is knowledge that we obtain about the world around us and constitutes perceptions, albeit not direct perception of the claim in question. Reason: It snows often in January in this climate and weather forecasts of this type are typically accurate, therefore....
Conclusion: It is fairly likely that the claim "It is snowing outside" is correct, thus the claim is accepted.
CLAIM: "It is snowing in Houston"
Now what if it is summer in Houston? Since the perceptions have changed, so will the reasoning. Now the claim is much less likely. Direct observation of the snow would be necessary, and since aside from news reports, most of us would be unable to do so, this claim would be rejected.
CLAIM: "It is snowing in Uzbekistan"
Perception: Let's say the month is November. What do you know about the climate of Uzbekistan? Do you even know where it is on the map? Is it mountainous or flatlands?
Reason: Assuming you aren't familiar with this country, there aren't many perceptions of this claim that you can work with.
Conclusion: Who knows? Who cares? the claim is ignored from ignorance. Without further information, this is the position most people would take.
HANDLING DISAGREEMENT
So what happens when there is a rejection of the agnostic claim? How should we continue in our noble goal of consensus? If the claimant believes a complete claim has been made (perceptions and agreed upon reasoning), then the burden now falls on the dissenter to explain how the claim was insufficient. Maybe the dissenter has experienced different perceptions that are in contradiction or possibly he has alternate reasoning to be considered. Or perhaps, as is often the case, the forms of reasoning can not be agreed upon. It is up to the dissenter to point these out.
Many would object that this is shifting the burden of proof, but it is not. For if enough information has been presented that a negative position can be evaluated, then it can be argued that an evidenced claim has been made. Only if an evaluation can not be reached can one say that an evidenced claim was not made. In other words, not enough information was provided to reach a conclusion. This is a huge differing point between myself and most mainstream atheists, who maintain that they do not need to defend their position because the theist has not met his burden of proof. They assume then, and I believe arrogantly so, that the position of atheism is taken simply because it is the default belief. But the theists have made very elaborate claims indeed (however flawed they may be), and the atheists have not withheld judgment on these claims out of ignorance. No, the atheists have outright rejected the theists' claim because they find it does not match with their existing perceptions of reality. So to continue reiterating that god (most likely) does not exist simply because the theist has not yet met his burden of proof is akin to saying that the theist is wrong because he is not yet right, which of course is circular reasoning. How is he not yet right? This is the burden of the dissenter to explain, assuming a discussion is to continue.
FAITH
Is the claim "God Exists" a gnostic or agnostic claim? Many theists would argue that since they are "certain God exists" that it must be gnostic. True enough, many of the discussions about God can be gnostic in nature, such as discussing the nature of God as he is described in the Christian bible. This is very much akin to a judge coming to decisions about the meaning of the definition of a law. But there is a huge leap to go from that gnostic knowledge of a hypothetical god and to apply it to the actual reality in which we all exist. We all know this as the Leap of Faith. Does faith enable us to make gnostic claims about an otherwise agnostic reality? Has the theist found a worthy loophole?
What is Faith then? The word has many definitions, some quite similar to each other. In order to clarify what is meant when we say faith and to reach conclusions about its value, we should distinguish between these definitions and their uses. I present my own wording in these definitions, but I trust the reader will find them compatible with standard dictionary entries.
Definition 1) Faith: Synonymous with trust, in regards to accepting the veracity of another's claims. I.E. "I have faith that you wouldn't lie to me." Here, the trust is given not blindly, but based on some prior precedence of trustworthiness. The precedence by which this trust is placed (or misplaced) constitutes some form of evidence and reasoning. Therefore, this definition of faith can not be used to justify a belief in god, because god must necessarily already exist before you can find him to be trustworthy.
Definition 2) Faith: A defined set of beliefs that are held by a group of people. I.E. "The Jewish or Christian faith"
But the definition of "faith" as it applies within the context of justifying real world claims to be gnostic is: Definition 3) Faith: The belief that one's ideas concerning reality are absolutely and certainly true without regard for verifiable evidence. This definition as I have presented it my seem harsh and biased, but let me demonstrate that it holds true. Let's see it in use. "How do you know the Bible is God's perfect word? You just have to have faith." But what if scholarly research and evidence supports the conclusion that the Bible is a flawed work written by many human authors, each with their own interpretations, and then edited later for internal consistency? In fact, how does one go about showing that the Bible was written by anyone other than human beings? I would argue it's impossible, but regardless, the de facto religious response to demands for evidence will inevitably be: "You just have to have Faith"
Faith in this context is consistently used as an alternative to evidence as a means of acquiring information and asserting claims about reality. In fact, by its usage we can assume that they are diametrically opposed to each other. No where else in human experience do we use this definition of faith. We may have faith (trust) in a doctor's assessment of our illness because we believe that she has made this assessment based upon proper observation of our symptoms and the application of years of experience and knowledge. But what if the doctor told you that your illness was caused by a horrible form of cancer, but the only proof she could provide you was that she had "faith". No tests were done, no diagnosis was performed, she just reached a conclusion about your health and is now insisting that she knows with certainty that you have cancer. You may not even feel all that sick, it's no matter - just have faith. This way of forming beliefs would be absolutely inconceivable in any other realm of human discourse outside of religion.
If a claim has evidence, then you don't need faith in the first place. Evidence is far more effective at conveying to another individual the truth value of an idea because it is based upon something that exists outside the mind of the person making the claim. A fossil can be found and studied by anyone on the planet. A measurement can be consistent despite the person holding the ruler. An X-ray can show the same broken bone regardless of who takes it, and the print can be shown to anyone who wishes to draw a conclusion from it. Faith on the other hand, is nothing more than an idea used to reinforce another idea. There's nothing to connect it to reality other than to continue asserting it. This makes it far less convincing, since it requires the other individual to already believe it in order for the faith-based claim to appear to have any merit at all. How then is this a valid means of acquiring new information or reconciling that information with someone else's ideas? It's worthless. It has no reconciliatory power whatsoever. Who has ever been convinced of a competing faith-based idea because of the compulsion of the opposing party's equally stubborn faith?
Thus, faith is not a means of reaching a closer understanding of reality. Instead, faith is a defense mechanism design to prevent the reconciliation of cherished ideas with observed reality. The individual who insists that faith is a means of supporting a claim is not playing fairly. Remember that in order for an agnostic claim to be presented and accepted, both parties must agree upon the standards of evidence: perceptions and reasoning. But the theist makes a claim based on a standard that is, by design, irreconcilable. The ball is neither in your court nor his, you are in fact playing completely different games, which while being superficially similar, actually have different rules and win conditions. The theist believes he is making a gnostic claim - one where certainty can be reached - and the information that justifies his claim, the information that you would need to counter in order for your ideas to be adopted, is tucked safely away inside his head, never to be harmed or affected by any information you could possibly put forth. If you play the theist's faith-based game, you have lost before you ever began.
So I reiterate: faith is not an alternative to evidence for acquiring and justifying ideas. It is a proxy, a false idol, it is the lie that an idea can be self supporting as long as it is claimed to be. This does not accomplish anything useful or meaningful for the human race. The fact that faith has been purported as a positive, even honorable, means of defending belief has become a scourge on the face of humanity. Empowering people with the certainty they require to commit horrible acts of atrocity from war, genocide, and pervasive social oppression. Religion alone does not bear this burden, but without the certainty that comes from the misappropriated gnostic belief that faith provides, atrocities such as these would be very difficult to justify. If a dictator wants to wipe out an entire race of people, he's going to need to prove absolutely that they deserve it. Good luck accomplishing this with an agnostic claim. The responsibility that religion bears is that it is the single most predominant propagator of this ideology of faith. And unfortunately, religious beliefs are a dime a dozen, ensuring that everyone from intellectuals to radicals have a steady source of certainty to drive their less justified beliefs and the actions that invariably result from them.
At the core of any thought invoking discussion on the existence of god is the question of how do we know what we know. In philosophy this topic is called epistemology. Now there are many prevailing ideas concerning epistemology and some of them are completely irreconcilable with each other which can cause insurmountable difficulties in coming to an agreement on intense philosophical ideas. As an overview and at the risk of over simplifying the matter, I'm going to propose that most of these ideas can be boiled down into two main competing schools of thought: Relativism and Objectivism. Unfortunately, a relativist and an objectivist will most likely be unable to agree with each other at a core fundamental level and a consensus will be impossible.
Relativism: Relativism is the declaration that all ideas, regardless of their incompatibility, should be considered equally valid. Notice that relativism avoids making any declaration of "truth". Instead it carefully circumvents truth by focusing on a person's right to believe what they want to. This may take the form of complete ideological relativism, but more often it can be seen as a diplomatic relativism, wherein the individual adopts relativistic stances on various controversial issues simply for the sake of diffusing conflict and tension.
Objectivism, then, is the declaration and pursuit of a truth that is independent of the believer. The problem that the objectivist is faced with, and which the relativist has cleverly avoided, is the question of how we determine this "truth" that is out there. If two people hold conflicting ideas about a subject how can they reconcile these ideas into one coherent perspective? Rather than elaborate on the myriad forms of truth that people have fought for over the millennia, I will put forth my own conclusions in regards to epistemology for the reader's evaluation. I ask for some allowance to slightly redefine certain words from their typical usage for the purposes of clarifying my ideas.
GNOSTIC Vs. AGNOSTIC TRUTH
There are two basic forms of truth that we can deliberate over: Gnostic truths and Agnostic truths. Eradicate from your mind any preconceived notions of the meaning of the word "agnostic", it does not necessitate a belief, or lack thereof, in the existence of God. Gnostic simply means "knowledge", typically used to implicate certainty, and agnostic therefore means without. "Gnostic" truths are those which we are absolutely sure of and "agnostic" truths are those where we can't possibly be sure of. Why can't we possibly be sure of some truths? Because human beings have long struggled with the obvious limitations of our own imperfections. Perceptions vary and complete information often remains elusive. Thus we are forced to come to conclusions about the world around us that are imperfect but nonetheless necessary. It can be said then that with all agnostic beliefs there is always a certain allowance for error, regardless of whether or not we want to acknowledge it.
So where is the line between gnostic and agnostic truth drawn? If we consider that the source of fallibility in agnostic truth is the imperfection in human perception then we must conclude that any truth as it pertains to the world that we perceive is agnostic. We must allow for some margin of error, often a greater one than we prefer. So what does that classification leave us for the realm of gnostic truth? Not much. It leaves us with a form of truth called tautologies, essentially something that is true because we've defined it to be that way. For example, 2+2=4. Why? because that's how we've defined "2" and "+" and "=" and "4". It is tautologically necessary that 2+2=4. How we apply these human created concepts to the real world determines their usefulness and is also subject to error. Tautological truths are very useful in the realm of mathematics and also Law. We can use the definition of a law (a human construct) to determine what it means. Or philosophy and logic itself can be considered tautological, but again, it is how we apply these ideas to the real world that takes us back into the realm of agnostic truth.
EVALUATING A CLAIM
In evaluating a gnostic or agnostic claim of truth, the processes are very similar, as are the possible outcomes. In a gnostic claim, we simply need to take the definition of the idea(s) in question, apply agreed upon forms of logic and reasoning, and when a valid conclusion is reached we call this a "proof". In an agnostic claim, we start with perceptions of the real world, apply agreed upon forms of logic and reasoning, and when a valid conclusion is reached it is called "evidence". Either way, one of three positions can be taken upon being presented with a complete "proof" or "evidence" of a claim.
1.) Acceptance of the claim: it is integrated into existing understanding of reality.
2.) Ignorance of the claim: the proof/evidence was not understood and could not be evaluated
3.) Rejection of the claim: the proof/evidence was understood but the definition and/or reasoning behind it are still in conflict with previously held beliefs.
Some examples of this for an agnostic claim are as follows:
CLAIM: "It is snowing outside" but you are unable to go to a window to observe directly.
Perception: since we are unable to observe directly, what exactly can we perceive? Let's say that it's January and there was a prior forecast for snow that day. This is knowledge that we obtain about the world around us and constitutes perceptions, albeit not direct perception of the claim in question. Reason: It snows often in January in this climate and weather forecasts of this type are typically accurate, therefore....
Conclusion: It is fairly likely that the claim "It is snowing outside" is correct, thus the claim is accepted.
CLAIM: "It is snowing in Houston"
Now what if it is summer in Houston? Since the perceptions have changed, so will the reasoning. Now the claim is much less likely. Direct observation of the snow would be necessary, and since aside from news reports, most of us would be unable to do so, this claim would be rejected.
CLAIM: "It is snowing in Uzbekistan"
Perception: Let's say the month is November. What do you know about the climate of Uzbekistan? Do you even know where it is on the map? Is it mountainous or flatlands?
Reason: Assuming you aren't familiar with this country, there aren't many perceptions of this claim that you can work with.
Conclusion: Who knows? Who cares? the claim is ignored from ignorance. Without further information, this is the position most people would take.
HANDLING DISAGREEMENT
So what happens when there is a rejection of the agnostic claim? How should we continue in our noble goal of consensus? If the claimant believes a complete claim has been made (perceptions and agreed upon reasoning), then the burden now falls on the dissenter to explain how the claim was insufficient. Maybe the dissenter has experienced different perceptions that are in contradiction or possibly he has alternate reasoning to be considered. Or perhaps, as is often the case, the forms of reasoning can not be agreed upon. It is up to the dissenter to point these out.
Many would object that this is shifting the burden of proof, but it is not. For if enough information has been presented that a negative position can be evaluated, then it can be argued that an evidenced claim has been made. Only if an evaluation can not be reached can one say that an evidenced claim was not made. In other words, not enough information was provided to reach a conclusion. This is a huge differing point between myself and most mainstream atheists, who maintain that they do not need to defend their position because the theist has not met his burden of proof. They assume then, and I believe arrogantly so, that the position of atheism is taken simply because it is the default belief. But the theists have made very elaborate claims indeed (however flawed they may be), and the atheists have not withheld judgment on these claims out of ignorance. No, the atheists have outright rejected the theists' claim because they find it does not match with their existing perceptions of reality. So to continue reiterating that god (most likely) does not exist simply because the theist has not yet met his burden of proof is akin to saying that the theist is wrong because he is not yet right, which of course is circular reasoning. How is he not yet right? This is the burden of the dissenter to explain, assuming a discussion is to continue.
FAITH
Is the claim "God Exists" a gnostic or agnostic claim? Many theists would argue that since they are "certain God exists" that it must be gnostic. True enough, many of the discussions about God can be gnostic in nature, such as discussing the nature of God as he is described in the Christian bible. This is very much akin to a judge coming to decisions about the meaning of the definition of a law. But there is a huge leap to go from that gnostic knowledge of a hypothetical god and to apply it to the actual reality in which we all exist. We all know this as the Leap of Faith. Does faith enable us to make gnostic claims about an otherwise agnostic reality? Has the theist found a worthy loophole?
What is Faith then? The word has many definitions, some quite similar to each other. In order to clarify what is meant when we say faith and to reach conclusions about its value, we should distinguish between these definitions and their uses. I present my own wording in these definitions, but I trust the reader will find them compatible with standard dictionary entries.
Definition 1) Faith: Synonymous with trust, in regards to accepting the veracity of another's claims. I.E. "I have faith that you wouldn't lie to me." Here, the trust is given not blindly, but based on some prior precedence of trustworthiness. The precedence by which this trust is placed (or misplaced) constitutes some form of evidence and reasoning. Therefore, this definition of faith can not be used to justify a belief in god, because god must necessarily already exist before you can find him to be trustworthy.
Definition 2) Faith: A defined set of beliefs that are held by a group of people. I.E. "The Jewish or Christian faith"
But the definition of "faith" as it applies within the context of justifying real world claims to be gnostic is: Definition 3) Faith: The belief that one's ideas concerning reality are absolutely and certainly true without regard for verifiable evidence. This definition as I have presented it my seem harsh and biased, but let me demonstrate that it holds true. Let's see it in use. "How do you know the Bible is God's perfect word? You just have to have faith." But what if scholarly research and evidence supports the conclusion that the Bible is a flawed work written by many human authors, each with their own interpretations, and then edited later for internal consistency? In fact, how does one go about showing that the Bible was written by anyone other than human beings? I would argue it's impossible, but regardless, the de facto religious response to demands for evidence will inevitably be: "You just have to have Faith"
Faith in this context is consistently used as an alternative to evidence as a means of acquiring information and asserting claims about reality. In fact, by its usage we can assume that they are diametrically opposed to each other. No where else in human experience do we use this definition of faith. We may have faith (trust) in a doctor's assessment of our illness because we believe that she has made this assessment based upon proper observation of our symptoms and the application of years of experience and knowledge. But what if the doctor told you that your illness was caused by a horrible form of cancer, but the only proof she could provide you was that she had "faith". No tests were done, no diagnosis was performed, she just reached a conclusion about your health and is now insisting that she knows with certainty that you have cancer. You may not even feel all that sick, it's no matter - just have faith. This way of forming beliefs would be absolutely inconceivable in any other realm of human discourse outside of religion.
If a claim has evidence, then you don't need faith in the first place. Evidence is far more effective at conveying to another individual the truth value of an idea because it is based upon something that exists outside the mind of the person making the claim. A fossil can be found and studied by anyone on the planet. A measurement can be consistent despite the person holding the ruler. An X-ray can show the same broken bone regardless of who takes it, and the print can be shown to anyone who wishes to draw a conclusion from it. Faith on the other hand, is nothing more than an idea used to reinforce another idea. There's nothing to connect it to reality other than to continue asserting it. This makes it far less convincing, since it requires the other individual to already believe it in order for the faith-based claim to appear to have any merit at all. How then is this a valid means of acquiring new information or reconciling that information with someone else's ideas? It's worthless. It has no reconciliatory power whatsoever. Who has ever been convinced of a competing faith-based idea because of the compulsion of the opposing party's equally stubborn faith?
Thus, faith is not a means of reaching a closer understanding of reality. Instead, faith is a defense mechanism design to prevent the reconciliation of cherished ideas with observed reality. The individual who insists that faith is a means of supporting a claim is not playing fairly. Remember that in order for an agnostic claim to be presented and accepted, both parties must agree upon the standards of evidence: perceptions and reasoning. But the theist makes a claim based on a standard that is, by design, irreconcilable. The ball is neither in your court nor his, you are in fact playing completely different games, which while being superficially similar, actually have different rules and win conditions. The theist believes he is making a gnostic claim - one where certainty can be reached - and the information that justifies his claim, the information that you would need to counter in order for your ideas to be adopted, is tucked safely away inside his head, never to be harmed or affected by any information you could possibly put forth. If you play the theist's faith-based game, you have lost before you ever began.
So I reiterate: faith is not an alternative to evidence for acquiring and justifying ideas. It is a proxy, a false idol, it is the lie that an idea can be self supporting as long as it is claimed to be. This does not accomplish anything useful or meaningful for the human race. The fact that faith has been purported as a positive, even honorable, means of defending belief has become a scourge on the face of humanity. Empowering people with the certainty they require to commit horrible acts of atrocity from war, genocide, and pervasive social oppression. Religion alone does not bear this burden, but without the certainty that comes from the misappropriated gnostic belief that faith provides, atrocities such as these would be very difficult to justify. If a dictator wants to wipe out an entire race of people, he's going to need to prove absolutely that they deserve it. Good luck accomplishing this with an agnostic claim. The responsibility that religion bears is that it is the single most predominant propagator of this ideology of faith. And unfortunately, religious beliefs are a dime a dozen, ensuring that everyone from intellectuals to radicals have a steady source of certainty to drive their less justified beliefs and the actions that invariably result from them.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)